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1 Introduction
People tend to interact with others who are similar to themselves. This tendency, called as-
sortative matching by social scientists, has been observed along many di¤erent dimensions and
in many di¤erent networking and group formation contexts. The dimensions studied include
race, religion, age, education, occupation and sex.1 Assortative matching is a potential cause for
concern as it limits peoples social worlds in a way that has powerful implications for the infor-
mation they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they experience(McPherson,
Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001: p. 415). Despite these concerns, very little is known about the
determinants of assortative matching.
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on assortative matching by gender when economi-
cally useful groups are being formed in African villages. To our knowledge, assortative matching
by gender has not been studied in Africa. In the countries where it has been studied, it is not
generally as prevalent as assorting based on race, education, and age (McPherson, Smith-Lovin
and Cook, 2001). However, it has been found to vary markedly according to the context, being
weaker among kin (Marsden, 1987) and stronger in more sex segregated environments such as
the workplace and, in the US, voluntary organizations (Bielby & Baron 1986, Kalleberg et al
1996, McPherson & Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986, 1987, Popielarz 1999). Other variations relate to
the type of individual being studied, being stronger among young children (Smith-Lovin and
McPherson 1993, Maccoby 1998), less educated individuals, and, in the US, among African
Americans and Hispanics as compared to Anglo Saxons (Marsden 1987, Blau et al 1991, Ver-
bragge, 1977). Extrapolating from these regularities, one might expect assorting on gender to
be common in African and other developing country villages.
1The types of ties that have been investigated include acquaintanceship, friendship, co-membership in voluntary
organizations, advice seeking, and support. And the contexts include whole nations, communities, workplaces,
and school classes. See for instance the evidence cited in McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001, Hitsch et al.
2005, Belot and Francesconi 2006, Fisman et al. 2008, Goyal 2007, and Jackson 2009.
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This expectation is supported by casual empiricism. Anyone who has convened meetings
in African villages has witnessed men and women sorting into single-sex clusters before taking
their seats. This pattern is reected in the way group-oriented development interventions are
presented. Women and men are often separated during participatory research exercises on the
grounds that they talk more freely (see, e.g., Chambers, 1994 and Welbourn, 1991). Micro
nance similarly tends to be o¤ered to single sexed most often all female  groups on the
grounds that it is empowering (Pitt et al, 2006) and that women are more responsive to social
sanctions (Murdoch, 1999 and Rahman, 1998). However, given the potential constraints that
assorting places on information ows, attitudes, and aspirations and the evidence indicating
that assortative matching is cumulative (Fischer 1982), reinforcing emergent gender assorting
may be ill advised and, in the long run, disempowering.
So, why do people assort? Assortative matching can be driven by homophyly, i.e., the
desire to interact with similar people. It can also result from equilibrium sorting on certain
attributes, as in Beckers (1973) model of the marriage market. Some evidence supports the
idea that opportunity matters, noting that matches depend on the distribution of types in the
population under study. Zipf (1949) and Gans (1968), for instance, found that geographical
proximity explains much of the observed assorting on race, ethnicity, class, education, and
occupation. Each of these mechanisms may play a role in African villages. However, they do not
explicitly account for several important factors. In African villages, as in villages throughout the
developing world, groups are often formed in order to address shared problems or take advantage
of collective opportunities. Put another way, villagers face returns to group formation relating
to economies of scale and the creation and management of local public goods and common
pool resources. However, with these returns come challenges relating to free-riding and the
enforcement of collective agreements in the absence of the formal rule of law. Under these
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circumstances, group formation and maintenance relies on trust and informal social enforcement.
But how do these factors a¤ect or relate to gender assorting? Is trust stronger within as compared
to between the sexes? If it is, we would see more assorting when trust is important. And is
social enforcement easier within single-sex as compared to mixed-sex groups? If it is, we would
see more assorting when social enforcement is important.
We contribute to the literature on assortative matching by addressing these questions using
an experiment conducted in 14 Zimbabwean villages. Within the experiment, the villagers played
a game in which group formation was benecial as it allowed group members to share risk. This
in turn enabled them to take on more risk and thereby secure higher expected experimental
payo¤s. To investigate the e¤ects of trust and social as opposed to formal enforcement on
assorting by gender three treatments were applied, with each village being randomly assigned
to one of these treatments.
In the rst treatment (Treatment 1), the risk sharing group formation agreements were
perfectly enforced by the experimenter. In the analysis, this treatment serves as the control. In
the second treatment (Treatment 2), the group formation agreements were supported only by
trust. Participants could secretly leave their groups if it was in their own self interest to do so.
However, such defectors were likely to be leaving their co-groupers with greater exposure to risk
and, this being the case, less group formation was expected under Treatment 2 as compared to
Treatment 1. At the same time, if trust is stronger within as compared to between the sexes, we
would expect to observe more assorting by gender under Treatment 2 as compared to Treatment
1. On the other hand, if trust is embodied within or information about the trustworthiness of
others ows via some form of social tie that tends not to be gender assortative then we would
expect to observe less assorting by gender under Treatment 2 as compared to Treatment 1.
Marsden (1987) found less assorting on gender in contexts where ties of kinship were important,
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although he did not account for trust in his analysis. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found a
strong association between a¢ liation to the same religious community and trust, although they
did not account for gender in their analysis. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps (2009) found weak
evidence that, in this experiment, co-memberships in voluntary community-based-organizations
(CBOs) serving an economic purpose support grouping based on trust. However, they did not
link this to gender assorting.
In the third treatment (Treatment 3), if participants wished to leave their groups, they had
to do so in public. Thus, under Treatment 3, the formation of groups within the experiment
was e¤ectively inserted into the ongoing series of village-based interactions. Under these circum-
stances defection could have been deterred through social enforcement and this could have made
grouping more attractive under Treatment 3 than Treatment 2. However, if social enforcement
is costly not only to a defector but also to an enforcer, possibly because it disrupts and jeop-
ardizes valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions, group formation may have been
less attractive under Treatment 3. Barr and Genicot (2008) demonstrated this theoretically and
found, using this experiment, that there was indeed less group formation under Treatment 3.
Later, Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009) showed that pairs of individuals who were engaged
in more valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions (proxied by the number of volun-
tary CBOs serving an economic purpose that they both belonged to) were less likely to group
together under Treatment 3. So, if valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions are
more likely to exist within as compared to between the sexes, we would expect less assorting by
gender under Treatment 3 than under either Treatment 1 or 2.
We analyze the data from the experiment in conjunction with data from surveys and ge-
nealogical mapping exercises. Applying a dyadic approach, we nd that under Treatment 1
(control) there was signicant and considerable, though not perfect, assorting into groups by
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gender. There was signicantly less assorting into groups on the basis of gender in Treatment 2
(trust) as compared to Treatment 1 (control) and neither more nor less assorting into groups on
the basis of gender in Treatment 3 (social enforcement) as compared to Treatment 1 (control).
Turning our attention to why there is less assorting into groups on the basis of gender when
group formation depends on trust we nd that the e¤ect is concentrated within religious groups
and family networks. In the absence of religious co-memberships and family ties, people are
no less likely to assort under Treatment 2 as under Treatment 1. However, despite religious
co-members and relatives being just as likely as others to shy away from grouping under Treat-
ment 2, when they do group that do it less assortatively on gender. This is consistent with
trustworthiness being unrelated to gender and religious and family networks facilitating ows
of information about individualstrustworthiness and, hence, more discerning decision-making
about who and who not to trust.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present our experimental design. The
empirical formulation is discussed in Section 3 and the data in Section 4. Section 5 provides
summary statistics and the empirical results are presented in Section 6. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Experimental design
The experiment involves a simple gamble choice game. One series of two rounds of this game
was played in each of 14 villages. The rounds took between one and two hours each and were
held on consecutive days. The day before the experiment started in each of the selected villages,
each household was visited and invited to send an adult of a specic gender to take part in the
experimental series in their village. To facilitate the deductive element of our analysis below,
whether a given household was invited to send a man or a woman was randomly determined.
However, to preserve our ongoing relationships with these villagers, if none of the specied
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gender was present, a member of the other was accepted. The householders were also told that
either the household head or their spouse would be the preferred representative.
In the rst round, played the day after the recruitment, each participant was interviewed
privately and asked to select one of six possible gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the
most risky (6). The gamble choice set was the same for all participants with equally likely high
and low earnings. Riskier gambles had higher expected returns. After selection of the gamble
choice the game was played and realized gains were paid to the participants in private. This
game structure was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences: the choice of
gamble implies a range of possible values for the individuals coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The gambles used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges
of the risk aversion coe¢ cient.2
Once the rst round of gamble choices was complete the participants were invited to return
and play the gamble choice game again the next day. Participants were then given the oppor-
tunity to form sharing groupswith other participants from the same village. They were told
that, within sharing groups, second round winnings would be pooled and shared equally.3
Each village was randomly assigned to one of three di¤erent institutional environments. In
Treatment 1, equal sharing of winnings among group members was exogenously enforced by the
experimenter: having joined a sharing group, the members could not subsequently change their
mind. So, regardless of gamble outcomes, winnings were pooled and shared equally.
In Treatment 2, each member of a sharing group could separately and secretly leave their
2The gambles are expressed in Zimbabwean $. The o¢ cial exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
around Z$55 for US$1 while the black market rate was around 2.5 times that amount. In the areas where the
experiment was conducted and at the time of the experiments, the daily wage for a farm labourer was around
Z$200. This is similar in magnitude to average experimental winnings of Z$158 in round 1 and Z$172 in round 2.
3The verbal framing of the game was kept to a minimum and, as a consequence, the game can be likened
to a variety of natural situations, including informal risk sharing, which has been extensively studied in village
communities (e.g., Udry 1994, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001, and Fafchamps and Lund 2003), and group
lending with joint liability (e.g., Karlan 2007, Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999 and 2000). There is no
lending in the game, but participants de facto invest a sure amount (gamble 1) in various risky investments
(gambles 2 to 6).
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groups after nding out the outcome of their gamble. In this case, they kept their winnings
but received no share of the winnings of others in the group. In this treatment, the benets
associated with joining a group depended on the level of trust.
Treatment 3 di¤ered from Treatment 2 in that individuals who chose to leave their groups
had to publicly conrm that they were doing so in front of all the other participants in their
village. In this treatment, the benets associated with group formation depended on the ease
with which social enforcement could be applied and the potential damage that its application
might do to ongoing valuable but vulnerable series of interactions.
Under each treatment, the consequences of and rules relating to risk sharing group formation
and defection were explained to the participants at the end of the session on the rst day. The
participants were then given approximately 24 hours to form a group. If they chose to do so
they had to register together on the second day of the game. The second round gamble choices
were made during private interviews and no rules were applied to or recommendations made
concerning gamble choices within groups. Under Treatment 2, decisions to leave groups and,
under Treatment 3, intentions to leave groups were also expressed and recorded during these
interviews. Under Treatment 3, decisions to leave groups had to be conrmed by the leavers
revealing themselves to all present when invited to do so after all participants had made their
decisions in private interviews. Finally, under all treatments, each participant received their
winnings during a second, brief, private interview just prior to being dismissed.
3 Empirical formulation
Building on the work of Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009), our empirical analysis starts with
the estimation of a dyadic model as follows. Let mij = 1 if i joins a risk sharing group with
individual j, and 0 otherwise. The network matrix M  [mij ] is symmetrical since mij = mji
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by construction. As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), this implies that the explanatory
variables must enter the model symmetrically. So, the rst model that we estimate is:
mij = 0 + 1jfi   fj j+ 2(fi + fj) + 3dij + 4(tij  dij)
+5jzi   zj j+ 6(zi + zj) + tij + uij (1)
where fi indicates the sex of i, equaling 1 if i is female and zero if i is male, dij is a vector of
the characteristics of the pre-existing relationship between individuals i and j, tij is a vector of
dummy variables indicating which treatment individuals i and j played under, zi is a vector of
other relevant characteristics of individual i including their gamble choice in the rst round, vij
are village xed e¤ects, uij is the error term, and 0 to 6 are the coe¢ cients to be estimated.
A negative and signicant coe¢ cient 1 indicates assortative matching by gender in the
group formation process. A positive (negative) 2 indicates that women engage in more (less)
grouping activity than men. Coe¢ cients 3 and 4 capture the e¤ects of pre-existing network
ties and variations in those e¤ects across treatments.4 Coe¢ cients 5 and 6 capture the e¤ects
of a number of other individual characteristics that serve as controls.
We then expand the model to include two additional sets of interaction terms:
mij = 0 + 1jfi   fj j+ 2(fi + fj) + 3dij + 4(tij  dij)
+5jzi   zj j+ 6(zi + zj) + 1(tij  jfi   fj j)
+2(tij  (fi + fj)) + tij + uij (2)
A signicant positive (negative) coe¢ cient 1 indicates that assortative matching by gender
4The interaction e¤ects between pre-existing network ties and the experimental treatments were the focus in
Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps (2009).
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is lower (higher) in the corresponding treatment, while coe¢ cient 2 picks up the di¤erential
e¤ects of the treatments on grouping by women and men.
Models (1) and (2) are estimated using a Logit. When estimating these models it is essential
to correct standard errors for non-independence arising because residuals from dyadic obser-
vations involving the same individual i may be correlated, negatively or positively, with each
other. Here, we correct the standard errors by clustering by dyad, as proposed by Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007).5
4 The data
The experiment was conducted in 23 Zimbabwean villages in 2001. However, in this paper we use
the data from only 14 of these villages. Of the remaining 9, 3 made up a control sample in which
no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various surveys and
mapping exercises upon which we draw. Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in
the early 1980s as result of land redistribution. These resettled villages are relatively small and
geographically concentrated. They have a strong agricultural focus and a stable composition.
Most heads of households and their spouses have resided in the village for at least one decade.
Due to the random selection of settlers, the adult inhabitants of these villages are less likely to be
genetically related to each other compared to members of the non-resettled villages. However,
they engage more in associational activity and have more marriage ties within the villages (see
Barr (2004) and Dekker (2004) for details).
Data on the participantsindividual characteristics, including their sex, age, education, and
their position within the household, were collected at the time of the experiment. These were
5 Ideally we would have clustered by village, thereby, accounting for non-independence across all dyads within
the same experimental session as well. However, we have data from only 14 village sessions and Nichols and
Zeckhauser (2004) argue that when the number of clusters is less than 50, clustering may result in inconsistent
standard errors. The main ndings presented below hold if one clusters by village.
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combined with data from other sources collected prior to the experiment. The combined dataset
provides an exceptionally rich description of the economic and social contexts of the participants.
Data on household incomes and holdings of livestock wealth were obtained from the Zimbabwe
Rural Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS), collected by Bill Kinsey and his team of eld
researchers in 1999 and constructed by Trudy Owens and Hans Hoogeveen. Kinsey et al. (1998),
Gunning et al. (2000) and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
In the analysis we make use of information relating to three types of pre-existing ties. Data on
kinship ties are drawn from specically designed social mapping exercises. These were conducted
in 1999 and 2001 by village focus groups involving one representative from each household
residing in each village (Dekker 2004). The data on memberships in religious congregations and
CBOs are drawn from a survey conducted by Barr in 2000 (see Barr 2004 for details). For the
purpose of the analysis presented here, CBOs include only those that have an explicit economic
purpose e.g., micro-nance, mutual insurance, funeral societies, irrigation and livestock rearing
cooperatives.
5 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the 382 participants who took part in both rounds of
the experiment in the 14 villages.6 These observations form the basis for our analysis. Just
over half of the participants (52 percent) were women. The average participant is middle-aged
and has slightly more than primary education. Two thirds of the sample are married and are
either a household head or a spouse of a household head. Annual household monetary income
and livestock wealth are approximately log-normally distributed and are incorporated into the
6Of the participants in the rst round, 19 did not turn up on the second day, sending a replacement from the
same household in their stead. Because we do not have rst round gamble choice data for the replacements, they
are excluded from the analysis. However, if we do not control for gamble choice in the group formation regressions
and include the replacements, the other ndings remain qualitatively unchanged.
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analysis in log form.7 The majority of the participants have a religious a¢ liation most often
with one of the many apostolic churches existing in Zimbabwe. On average, participants belong
to between two and three CBOs with an economic purpose.
Also reported in Table 2 is the proportion of the sample playing under each of the treatments,
the proportion who joined groups, the average gamble choices (where the gamble choice identier
is treated as being cardinal for brevity), and the average winnings per subject in each round
of the experiment.8 Treatment 2 is under-represented in the sample. This is the result of
having to drop a number of villages owing to incomplete data. However, there remain su¢ cient
observations under each treatment to make meaningful comparisons. Gamble choices in round
1 are included in the logit regressions to control for attitudes towards risk. Winnings in round
1 are included to control for income e¤ects and for the possibility that individuals take high
winnings in the rst round as indication that their luck is in and that, as a consequence, they
have no need for insurance in the form of risk sharing. Grouping decisions are the focus of our
analysis: just under half of the participants joined sharing groups in the second round of the
experiment and the average group size was just over 3 members.
Turning to the characteristics of the relationships between participants, we use the kinship
data to construct a variable indicating whether a dyad is related either by blood or marriage.9
When interpreting results relating to this variable, it is important to recall that each household
was invited to send only one representative to the experimental session in their village. So,
husbands and wives are never present together, and people are in the same experiment as their
7 log(crop income+1) and log(livestock wealth+1). Livestock wealth is measured in money terms using local
market prices for trained oxen, household data on numbers of livestock of di¤erent types, and applying the
following weights: trained oxen 1.00; cow 0.71; bull 0.83; young oxen 0.59; calf 0.18; sheep 0.08; goat 0.06; pig
0.06 (Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001).
8Descriptive statistics on winning rates support the randomness of the lottery in the experiment: (1) the
overall winning rate was 48% in round 1 and 46% in round 2; (2) winning is independent of gamble choice in both
rounds; and (3) winning is independent between rounds 1 and 2.
9Barr et al. (2008) separated out genetic relatedness and marriage ties. Here, because we wish to interact
elements of dij with other variables and because genetic relatedness is rare in the dataset, we collapse the two
types of family ties into one.
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children or siblings only if they live in separate households. Furthermore, most villages in the
study were made up of stranger households at the time of their resettlement in the early 1980s.
As a consequence the majority of the kinship ties in the dataset are between in-laws. Religious
co-membership is captured by a dummy variable indicating that members i and j of a dyad
belong to the same religious congregation and a count variable is used to capture the number of
CBOs (serving an economic purpose) in which both i and j are members.
Table 3 summarizes the dyadic sample containing each possible pair of participants within
each of the 14 villages. Because the average group size in the experiment is small, only 7 percent
of all within-village dyads are in the same group. As the sample participants was nearly equally
divided between male and female participants, just under half of all dyads are made up of one
female and one male. The average dyad contains just over one female.
Although almost nine out of every ten participants belong to a religious congregation, only
19 percent of the dyads belong to the same congregation. This reects the diversity of faiths
present in each of the studied villages. The average dyad share memberships in just under one
CBO. Table 3 also summarizes the dyadic control variables used in the analysis.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Group formation and gender
We begin our analysis with a simple cross-tabulation of the data. As well as revealing the overall
level of gender assorting in the data, cross-tabulation alerts us to small cell sizes which can lead
to spurious ndings in multivariate analysis.
The cross tabulations are reported in Table 4 in the form of a 4  4 matrix. The top
left-hand cell relates to the full dyadic sample described in Table 3. All the other cells relate
to sub-samples variably dened. In the top row of the matrix, the full sample, pooled across
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treatments, is divided into sub-samples with respect to dyad type: in the second column all
female dyads are considered; in the third all male dyads are considered; and in the fourth mixed
gender dyads are considered. The number of dyadic observations in each cell is listed at the top
of the cell. Mixed gender dyads represent roughly half in each treatment.
The top right-hand cell shows that, across all treatments only 2.1 percent of mixed gender
dyads co-group whereas 14 percent of female dyads and 10 percent of male dyads co-group.
The di¤erences in co-grouping between mixed gender dyads and both types of same-gender
dyad are statistically signicant and indicate assortative matching by gender: participants in
the experiment are much more likely to form a group with individuals of the same sex. This
is also illustrated by the gender composition of the groups. Of the 47 groups formed during
the experiment, 17 groups (36 percent) were male only, 21 (45 percent) were female only and 9
(19 percent) were mixed. The di¤erence in co-grouping between female dyads and male dyads,
however, is not statistically signicant suggesting that the assorting is not driven by everyone,
male and female, wishing to group only with women or men.
The second, third, and fourth rows of the table split the sample by treatment. In the
rst column of Table 4 we see that, while between 11 and 12 percent of dyads co-grouped
under Treatment 1 (control: externally enforced contracts), only 9 percent co-grouped under
Treatment 2 (trust), and just two percent co-grouped under Treatment 3 (social enforcement).
The fourth column of Table 4 is the most interesting for our purpose. While only two
percent of mixed-gender dyads co-grouped under Treatment 1, over ve percent co-grouped
under Treatment 2. The opposite pattern is observed for male and female dyads: in both cases,
the proportion of dyads that co-grouped was smaller under Treatment 2 than Treatment 1. In
Treatment 3 not even one percent of mixed gender dyads co-grouped.10 These di¤erences in
10This needs to be born in mind when, later on, we consider further sub-divisions of the cells in this matrix.
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treatment e¤ects on same- and mixed-gender dyads are presented graphically in Figure 1. The
full heights of the columns in the histogram indicate the proportion of dyads co-grouping under
each treatment. Each column is divided into same-gender (teal green) and mixed-gender (orange)
segments. The Figure shows clearly the overall decline in co-grouping and the simultaneous
increase in mixed-gender grouping as we move from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2.
Table 4 also shows that female dyads are more likely than male dyads to share a family tie
and/or a religious co-membership. They are also more likely than male dyads to belong to the
same CBO. In contrast, mixed gender dyads resemble the full sample in terms of family ties
and religious and CBO co-memberships. The di¤erences between all female and all male dyads
justify moving to multivariate analysis.
Coe¢ cient and standard error estimates for model (1) are presented in column 1 of Table 5.11
In column 2 the treatment dummies are replaced by a full set of village dummies. These control
for any village-level unobservables. However, they also introduce a confound with respect to
co-memberships in economic CBOs as these vary considerably and signicantly across villages.
Coe¢ cient and standard error estimates for model (2) are presented in column 3 of Table 5.
Then, in column 4, the treatment dummies are replaced by a full set of village dummies once
again. In all models, the additional controls include family ties, religious co-membership, co-
memberships in CBOs, and interaction terms between these network variables and Treatments
2 and 3. We see in model (1) (columns 1 and 2) that, even with the controls, the mixed gender
dyad dummy has a highly signicant negative coe¢ cient. This conrms the result reported in
Table 4. The marginal e¤ect that can be derived from the estimated coe¢ cient indicates that
mixed gender dyads are ve percentage points less likely to co-group than same-gender dyads.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report results for model (2) which contains interaction terms
11Only the coe¢ cients on the variables of specic interest are reported. See Appendix Table A1 for the full set
of estimates.
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between the Mixed gender dyad dummy and indicator variables for Treatments 2 and 3.12 The
results indicate that the patterns reported in Table 4 and Figure 1 are robust and signicant.
The coe¢ cient on T2 x Mixed gender dyadis positive and signicant in both models, while the
coe¢ cient on T3 x Mixed gender dyadis not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The coe¢ cient
on the Mixed gender dyad dummy is much larger in model (2) as compared to model (1);
according to model (2), under Treatment 1 mixed gender dyads are eight percentage points less
likely to co-group than same-sex dyads, whereas under Treatment 2 they are less than one half
of a percentage point less likely to co-group. This seems to suggest that, under Treatment 2,
there is no gender assorting. However, the linear restriction tests reported at the bottom of the
table indicate that gender assorting, while minimal, is statistically signicant under Treatment
2.
6.2 Gender assorting and trust
In this section, we present an analysis aimed at identifying the causal mechanism behind the
nding that gender assorting is less pronounced when trust is important. In the introduction, we
conjectured that this would occur if either trust is embodied within some form of social tie that
is not highly gender assortative or trustworthiness varies across individuals and is not gender
di¤erentiated and knowledge of the trustworthiness of others is enhanced by social ties that are
not highly gender assortative.
The results presented in Table 5 provide no evidence of trust being embodied within either
family networks or the networks associated with belonging to the same religious congregation
and only weak evidence that co-memberships in economic CBOs embody trust (column 2).
However, they do not exclude the possibility that such ties a¤ord individuals greater knowledge
12Treatment 1 is the basis for comparison.
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about who they may or may not be able to trust within the context of the experiment.
We do not have data on who knows what about whose trustworthiness. However, as a rst
step towards identifying this mechanism, we can conduct a reduced form analysis by cautiously
introducing additional interaction terms into model (2).13
The rst step is to establish whether and to what extent each of the social tie types for
which we have data is gender assortative. Table 4 shows that mixed gender dyads are less likely
than same-sex dyads to belong to the same family network, be members of the same religious
congregation, and to belong to the same economic CBOs. However, according to simple dyadic
regression analyses, it is only in the case of the latter that the di¤erence is signicant, i.e., that
there is evidence of signicant gender assorting and, even here, the assorting is considerably less
marked than in the experimental group formation.14
The next step is to investigate whether villagers sharing each of the social tie types for which
we have data are less likely to assort under Treatment 2 as compared to villagers with no such
ties. To do this we augment model (2) by including additional interaction terms of the form T2
x Mixed gender dyad x CBO co-memberships, Mixed gender dyad x CBO co-memberships,
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership, Mixed gender dyad x Religious co-
membership, T2 x Mixed gender dyad x Familyand Mixed gender dyad x Family. However,
owing to small cell sizes, we investigate only one type of social tie at a time and we do not include
interactions between Treatment 3 and the social ties at the same time.15 If the coe¢ cient on T2
x Mixed gender dyad x Familyis positive and/or the linear combination of this coe¢ cient and
the coe¢ cients on Mixed gender dyad, T2 x Mixed gender dyadand Mixed gender dyad x
13Caution is required because some cell sizes are already very small. Specically, recall that less than one
percent of mixed gender dyads chose to group togenter in the experiment under Treatment 3.
14See Appendix Table A2 for
15To avoid spurious inference, we have to include either T2 x Number of females in dyad x CBO co-memberships
and Number of females in dyad x CBO co-memberships, T2 x Number of females in dyad x Religious co-
membershipand Number of females in dyad x Religious co-membership, or T2 x Number of females in dyad x
Familyand Number of females in dyad x Familydepending on the model.
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Familyis insignicant, while the linear combination of the coe¢ cients on Mixed gender dyad
and T2 x Mixed gender dyad is negative and signicant, it can be taken as evidence that,
within family networks, individuals know who they can and cannot trust, trustworthiness is not
gender di¤erentiated and, as a consequence, gender has no e¤ect on who groups with whom.
The sign and signicance of the coe¢ cients and relevant linear combinations of coe¢ cients on
terms relating to the other types of social tie can be interpreted similarly.16
Table 6 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 present the key coe¢ cient and standard error
estimates from the models focusing on the possible role of family networks and do and do not
included village dummy variables respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present key the coe¢ cient and
standard error estimates from the models focusing on the possible role of religious co-membership
and do and do not included village dummy variables respectively. And columns 5 and 6 present
the key coe¢ cient and standard error estimates from the models focusing on the possible role of
CBO co-memberships and do and do not included village dummy variables respectively.17 For
each model we also present both the results of the linear restriction tests described above and
a corresponding set of tests focusing on Treatment 1. This second set of tests can be viewed as
placebo tests in the following sense if the value of the social ties relates specically to access to
knowledge about otherstrustworthiness, gender assorting should be similarly signicant within
and outside the social tie networks under Treatment 1.
Across all six models only one of the newly introduced interaction terms, T2 x Mixed gender
dyad x Religious co-membershipbears a signicant positive coe¢ cient (columns (3) and (4)).
16An alternative to the linear restriction tests invovling interaction terms would be to run the estimations on
sub-samples. However, it would not be possible to apply Fafchamps and Guberts (2007) method for adjusting the
standard errors to these sub-sample estimations unless one assumed interdependence only across dyads sharing a
common element within families, or religions or CBOs. The linear restriction test approach allows us to use the
method to correct for all possible interdependence across all dyads sharing a common element within the same
village, i.e., it is a much more comprehensive adjustment.
17The full sets of estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors for each set of models are presented in Appendix
tables A3, A4, and A5.
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This is consistent with gender assorting in the experiment being signicantly less pronounced
within networks of religious co-membership under Treatment 2 as compared to outside such
networks under the same treatment. This is also reected in the results of the linear restriction
tests for Treatment 2; outside the networks of religious co-membership gender assorting is sig-
nicant under Treatment 2, whereas inside the networks it is insignicant. Further, note that
no such pattern is observed under Treatment 1. There, gender assorting is just as signicant
within as compared to outside the networks.
The new interaction terms relating to family networks are never signicant. However, the
linear restriction tests reveal a story similar to that relating to religious co-membership. Outside
family networks gender assorting is signicant under Treatment 2, whereas inside the networks it
is insignicant. Further, no such pattern is observed under Treatment 1. There, gender assorting
is just as signicant within as compared to outside the networks.
For the networks of co-memberships in CBOs the results are less conclusive. When the
village dummies are excluded from the model, dyads with two or more CBO co-memberships
appear less likely to group assortatively on gender as compared to dyads with no or only one
co-membership. However, this nding is not robust to the introduction of the village dummies.
7 Summary and conclusion
Assortative matching has been observed in many social contexts. Using an experiment we
examine assorting on gender when economically useful groups are formed in developing-country
villages. Assorting on gender, while only occasionally observed in developed-country studies,
has been casually observed by many in developing countries and is now systematically being
built into many group-oriented development interventions. And yet, very little is known about
the mechanisms underlying the emergent gender assorting in developing countries, while studies
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base elsewhere have led to concerns about, rst, the cumulative e¤ects of assorting and, second,
the constraints that assorting places on information ows, attitudes, and aspirations.
The formation and maintenance of economically, socially and politically useful groups in
developing countries relies on trust and social enforcement. So, our experiment was designed to
explore the interplay between trust and social enforcement on the one hand and gender assorting
into groups on the other. Analyzing the data resulting from this experiment we found less gender
assorting when group formation depended on trust compared to when no trust was required.
In addition, by analyzing the experimental data in conjunction with data on pre-existing so-
cial ties and individual characteristics, we found evidence that this reduction in gender assorting
when trust was important was owing to trustworthiness not being gender di¤erentiated combined
with social ties that were not gender assortative providing access to information about who was
and was not trustworthy. Family ties and religious co-membership appeared to be particularly
important here. However, it is important to remember that these e¤ects were identied using
a relatively small subject sample and, this being the case, a replication using a larger sample
would be useful.
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Table 1. Gamble choices in Z$ and implied relative risk aversion coefficients
Choice High payoff Low payoff EV RA class RA coeff.
1 100 100 100 Extreme infinity to 7.51
2 190 90 140 Severe 7.51 to 1.74
3 240 80 160 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81
4 300 60 180 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32
5 380 20 200 Slight-neutral 0.32 to 0.00
6 400 0 200 Neutral-negative 0 to -ve infinity
Table 2. Characteristics of participants
Percentage 




Years of schooling 6.762 3.207
Household head 41.9%
Spouse of household head 21.5%
Married 66.5%
Annual household income (1,000sZim$) 2.562 3.374
Ln(Annual household income + 1) 7.185 1.418
Houeshold livestock wealth (1,000sZim$) 11.656 10.124
Ln(Household livestock wealth + 1) 8.195 2.902
Belongs to a religious community 87.7%
Memberships in CBOs 2.30 2.29
Resettled household 75.9%
Experimental variables
Played under treatment 1 41.6%
Played under treatment 2 23.3%
Played under treatment 3 35.1%
Joined a group in round 2 48.7%
Size of group joined (=1 for singletons) 3.168 3.011
Gamble choice in round 1 3.231 1.170
Gamble choice in round 2 3.589 1.130
Winnings in round 1 (Zim$, 2001) 157.13 106.60
Winnings in round 2 (Zim$, 2001) 169.65 121.71
Observations 382
Table 3. Summary statistics for the dyadic sample
Percentage 
or mean Std. Dev.
Dyadic variables of specific interest
Join same group in experiment 7.3%
Mixed gender dyad 49.3%
Number of females in dyad 1.073 0.708
Family (genetically related or related by marriage) 21.4%
Religious co-membershipgroup 19.3%
Co-memberships in CBOs 0.940 1.134
Control variables: Dyadic differences
Difference in Round 1 gamble choice 1.230 1.066
Difference in Round 1 winnings 116.457 95.794
Difference in age 19.400 14.105
One a household head, one not 44.8%
Difference in years of schooling 3.545 2.720
Difference in ln(annual household income + 1) 1.171 1.301
Difference in household livestock wealth 2.288 3.143
Control variables: Dyadic sums
Sum of Round 1 gamble choices 6.466 1.621
Sum of Round 1 winnings 323.597 150.778
Sum of ages 84.029 24.842
Number of household heads in dyad 1.289 0.685
Sum of years of schooling 13.819 4.527
Sum of ln(annual houehold incomes + 1) 14.477 2.147
Sum of household livestock wealth 16.601 4.085
Observations 10470
Table 4. Dyadic Cross-tabulations
All dyads  Female dyads  Male dyads  Mixed gender dyads   
All treatments N= 10470  N= 3032  N= 2272  N= 5166
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Mixed gender dyads 0.493 49.3%
Join same group in exp. 0.073 7.3%  0.139 13.9%  0.102 10.2%  0.021 2.1%
Family 0.214 21.4%  0.270 27.0%  0.165 16.5%  0.203 20.3%
Religious co-membership 0.193 19.3%  0.229 22.9%  0.176 17.6%  0.180 18.0%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.940 57.8%  1.431 73.4%  0.653 43.3%  0.779 55.0%   
Treatment 1 N= 4532  N= 1486  N= 840  N= 2206
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Mixed gender dyads 0.487 48.7%
Join same group in exp. 0.115 11.5%  0.214 21.4%  0.188 18.8%  0.020 2.0%
Family 0.196 19.6%  0.234 23.4%  0.181 18.1%  0.177 17.7%
Religious co-membership 0.186 18.6%  0.209 20.9%  0.171 17.1%  0.176 17.6%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.980 58.6%  1.584 76.6%  0.564 41.7%  0.732 52.9%   
Treatment 2 N= 1698  N= 354  N= 488  N= 856
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Mixed gender dyads 0.504 50.4%
Join same group in exp. 0.088 8.8%  0.164 16.4%  0.094 9.4%  0.054 5.4%
Family 0.221 22.1%  0.316 31.6%  0.148 14.8%  0.224 22.4%
Religious co-membership 0.199 19.9%  0.333 33.3%  0.131 13.1%  0.182 18.2%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.718 51.9%  1.085 74.6%  0.479 34.0%  0.703 52.8%   
Treatment 3 N= 4240  N= 1192  N= 944  N= 2104
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Mixed gender dyads 0.496 49.6%
Join same group in exp. 0.021 2.1%  0.037 3.7%  0.030 3.0%  0.009 0.9%
Family 0.230 23.0%  0.302 30.2%  0.159 15.9%  0.221 22.1%
Religious co-membership 0.199 19.9%  0.223 22.3%  0.203 20.3%  0.183 18.3%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.986 59.2%  1.342 69.1%  0.822 49.6%  0.858 58.0%
Notes: 'Female-male dyads', 'Join same group', Same religious group', and 'Family' are all dichotomous (0,1) variables, so their 
means and percentages of non-zeros are equivalent; 'Comemberships. in CBOs' is a count variable, so the means and percentages 
of non-zeros are not identical.
Table 5. Dyadic analysis of treatment responses by different dyad types
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  
Mixed gender dyad (MG) -1.914 0.344 *** -1.954 0.340 *** -2.529 0.513 *** -2.530 0.521 ***
T2 x Mixed gender dyad (T2 x MG) 1.609 0.709 ** 1.521 0.729 **
T3 x Mixed gender dyad (T3 x MG) 1.075 0.771 1.015 0.776
Number of females in dyad 0.110 0.143 0.020 0.154 0.063 0.178 0.028 0.182
T2 x Number of females in dyad 0.118 0.359 -0.020 0.380
T3 x Number of females in dyad 0.085 0.277 -0.073 0.286
T2 (Treatment 2) -0.534 0.462 -0.984 0.516 *
T3 (Treatment 3) -1.935 0.372 *** -2.222 0.440 ***
Family (blood or marriage) -0.036 0.246 -0.095 0.257 -0.060 0.249 -0.119 0.263
Religious co-membership 0.049 0.190 0.061 0.185 0.056 0.197 0.071 0.196
CBO co-mememberships 0.108 0.074 0.134 0.074 * 0.097 0.077 0.112 0.076
T2 x Family -0.139 0.546 -0.394 0.565 -0.144 0.542 -0.348 0.541
T2 x Religious co-membership -0.198 0.515 0.338 0.531 -0.127 0.476 0.415 0.471
T2 x CBO co-mememberships 0.408 0.203 ** 0.167 0.209 0.377 0.190 ** 0.155 0.196
T3 x Family 1.090 0.529 ** 1.120 0.583 * 1.091 0.513 ** 1.128 0.572 **
T3 x Religious co-membership 0.881 0.414 ** 1.063 0.424 ** 0.875 0.414 ** 1.047 0.422 **
T3 x CBO co-mememberships -0.488 0.196 ** -0.346 0.188 * -0.471 0.191 ** -0.301 0.197
Village dummies included no yes no yes
Significance of assorting on gender under T2# * **
Significance of assorting on gender under T3## ** ***
Observations 10470 10470 10470 10470
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-
independence across dyads with a common element; all models also contain absolute differences in and sums of age, household 
headship dummies, years of schooling, log household income, log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round 
winnings; # - F-test applied to the linear restriction Mixed gender dyad + (T2 x Mixed gender dyad); ## F-test applied to the linear 
restriction Mixed gender dyad + (T3 x Mixed gender dyad); *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 6. Dyadic analysis exploring the role of social ties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  
Mixed gender dyad -2.674 0.568 *** -2.666 0.570 *** -2.455 0.538 *** -2.446 0.538 *** -2.192 0.600 *** -2.122 0.616 ***
T2 x Mixed gender dyad 1.755 0.751 ** 1.634 0.770 ** 1.373 0.755 * 1.299 0.773 * 1.117 0.796 1.014 0.826
T3 x Mixed gender dyad 0.882 0.736 0.816 0.753 1.145 0.752 1.101 0.758 1.003 0.769 0.930 0.771
Mixed gender dyad x Family 0.725 0.489 0.714 0.496
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x Family -0.841 0.932 -0.721 0.913
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those who are not family comems1 * **  
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those who are family comems2 insig. insig.  
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those who are not family comems3 *** ***  
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those who are family comems4 *** ***  
Mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership -0.413 0.446 -0.474 0.422
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership 1.290 0.680 * 1.275 0.671 *
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those with no relig. comem.1  ** **  
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those with a regil. comem5  insig insig.  
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those with no relig. comem.3  *** ***  
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those with a relig. comem6  *** ***  
Mixed gender dyad x CBO co-membership -0.465 0.472 -0.559 0.523
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x CBO co-memberships 0.571 0.533 0.648 0.548
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those with no CBO comems.1  ** **
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those with one CBO comems7  ** **
Sig. of gender assorting under T2 among those with two CBO comems8  insig. *
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those with no CBO comems.3  *** ***
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those with one CBO comems9  *** ***
Sig. of gender assorting under T1 among those with two CBO comems10  *** ***
Village dummies included no yes no yes no yes
1 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (T2 x MG), where MG=Mixed gender dyad; 2 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (T2 x MG) + (MG x Family) + (T2 x MG x Family); 
3 - sig. of coefficient on MG; 4 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (MG x Family); 
5 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (T2 x MG) + (MG x Relig) + (T2 x MG x Relig); 6 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (MG x Relig);  
7 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (T2 x MG) + (MG x CBO) + (T2 x MG x CBO); 8 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (T2 x MG) + (MG x 2 x CBO) + (T2 x MG x 2 x CBO);
9 - F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (MG x CBO); 10- F-test applied to linear restriction MG + (2 x CBO); 
Notes: Logit coefficients and standard errors presented; standard errors adjusted to account for non-independence across dyads with common elements; n = 10470; all models also contain No. females 
in dyad, T2 x No. females in dyad, T3 x No. females in dyad, Family, Relig. co-mems, CBO co-memems, T2 x Family, T2 x Relig. co-mem., T2 x CBO co-mems, T3 x Family, T3 x Relig. co-mem., T3 x 
CBO co-mems, and absolute differences in and sums of age, hh headship, schooling, log hh income, log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices and winnings; models (1) and (2) also contain No. 
females in dyad x Family and T2 x No. females in dyad x Family; models (3) and (4) also contain No. females in dyad x Relig. co-mem. and T2 x No. females in dyad x Relig. co-mem; models (5) and (6) 
also contain No. females in dyad x CBO co-mems and T2 x No. females in dyad x CBO co-mems;                *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table A1. Dyadic analysis of treatment responses by different dyad types all estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed gender dyad -1.914 0.344 *** -1.954 0.340 *** -2.529 0.513 *** -2.530 0.521 ***
T2 x Mixed gender dyad 1.609 0.709 ** 1.521 0.729 **
T3 x Mixed gender dyad 1.075 0.771 1.015 0.776
Number of females in dyad 0.110 0.143 0.020 0.154 0.063 0.178 0.028 0.182
T2 x Number of females in dyad 0.118 0.359 -0.020 0.380
T3 x Number of females in dyad 0.085 0.277 -0.073 0.286
T2 (Treatment 2) -0.534 0.462 -0.984 0.516 *
T3 (Treatment 3) -1.935 0.372 *** -2.222 0.440 ***
Family (blood or marriage) -0.036 0.246 -0.095 0.257 -0.060 0.249 -0.119 0.263
Religious co-membership 0.049 0.190 0.061 0.185 0.056 0.197 0.071 0.196
CBO co-mememberships 0.108 0.074 0.134 0.074 * 0.097 0.077 0.112 0.076
T2 x Family -0.139 0.546 -0.394 0.565 -0.144 0.542 -0.348 0.541
T2 x Religious co-membership -0.198 0.515 0.338 0.531 -0.127 0.476 0.415 0.471
T2 x CBO co-mememberships 0.408 0.203 ** 0.167 0.209 0.377 0.190 ** 0.155 0.196
T3 x Family 1.090 0.529 ** 1.120 0.583 * 1.091 0.513 ** 1.128 0.572 **
T3 x Religious co-membership 0.881 0.414 ** 1.063 0.424 ** 0.875 0.414 ** 1.047 0.422 **
T3 x CBO co-mememberships -0.488 0.196 ** -0.346 0.188 * -0.471 0.191 ** -0.301 0.197
Dyadic difference in
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.042 0.082 -0.010 0.087 0.048 0.083 -0.005 0.088
Round 1 winnings 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Age (years) -0.014 0.009 -0.017 0.009 * -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 *
Househodl head -0.211 0.175 -0.184 0.177 -0.194 0.176 -0.172 0.178
Schooling (years) 0.019 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.018 0.030 0.027 0.029
ln(household income) 0.091 0.087 0.067 0.062 0.087 0.086 0.064 0.061
ln(livestock wealth) 0.023 0.045 0.008 0.042 0.022 0.045 0.005 0.042
Dyadic sum of
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.067 0.055 0.051 0.056 0.066 0.056 0.045 0.056
Round 1 winnings -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001
Age (years) 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007
Househodl head -0.105 0.195 0.125 0.198 -0.097 0.192 0.124 0.198
Schooling (years) 0.034 0.031 0.063 0.032 * 0.035 0.031 0.063 0.031 *
ln(household income) -0.056 0.074 -0.016 0.064 -0.058 0.074 -0.015 0.066
ln(livestock wealth) 0.047 0.047 0.003 0.043 0.049 0.047 0.003 0.043
Constant -2.377 1.518 -2.251 1.335 * -2.223 1.503 -2.159 1.341
Village dummies included no yes no yes
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-
independence across dyads with a common element; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%.
Table A2. Dyadic analysis exploring the role of CBOs all estimates
Religious            
co-membership       
(logit)
CBO                
co-memberships      
(linear regression)
Related genetically or 
by marriage          
(logit)
Mixed gender dyad -0.137 -0.263 *** -0.060
(0.095) (0.059) (0.085)
Number of females in dyad 0.164 0.389 *** 0.316 **
(0.116) (0.088) (0.136)
Constant -1.543 *** 0.653 *** -1.624 ***
(0.163) (0.088) (0.176)
Observations 10470 10470 10470
Table A3. Dyadic analysis exploring the role of CBOs all estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed gender dyad -2.529 0.513 *** -2.530 0.521 *** -2.192 0.600 *** -2.122 0.616 ***
T2 x Mixed gender dyad 1.609 0.709 ** 1.521 0.729 ** 1.117 0.796 1.014 0.826
T3 x Mixed gender dyad 1.075 0.771 1.015 0.776 1.003 0.769 0.930 0.771
Mixed gender dyad x CBO co-membership -0.465 0.472 -0.559 0.523
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x CBO co-memberships 0.571 0.533 0.648 0.548
Number of females in dyad 0.063 0.178 0.028 0.182 0.027 0.197 -0.016 0.209
T2 x Number of females in dyad 0.118 0.359 -0.020 0.380 0.398 0.434 -0.104 0.470
T3 x Number of females in dyad 0.085 0.277 -0.073 0.286 0.085 0.280 -0.070 0.289
No. females in dyad x CBO co-membership 0.028 0.105 0.035 0.102
T2 x No. females in dyad x CBO co-membership -0.254 0.200 0.091 0.217
T2 (Treatment 2) -0.984 0.516 * -1.190 0.602 **
T3 (Treatment 3) -2.222 0.440 *** -2.245 0.437 ***
Family (blood or marriage) -0.060 0.249 -0.119 0.263 -0.053 0.250 -0.112 0.262
Religious co-membership 0.056 0.197 0.071 0.196 0.062 0.198 0.076 0.197
CBO co-mememberships 0.097 0.077 0.112 0.076 0.063 0.192 0.067 0.196
T2 x Family -0.144 0.542 -0.348 0.541 -0.129 0.534 -0.379 0.547
T2 x Religious co-membership -0.127 0.476 0.415 0.471 -0.029 0.493 0.395 0.492
T2 x CBO co-mememberships 0.377 0.190 ** 0.155 0.196 0.589 0.340 * 0.025 0.383
T3 x Family 1.091 0.513 ** 1.128 0.572 ** 1.079 0.516 ** 1.121 0.575 *
T3 x Religious co-membership 0.875 0.414 ** 1.047 0.422 ** 0.869 0.416 ** 1.041 0.426 **
T3 x CBO co-mememberships -0.471 0.191 ** -0.301 0.197 -0.429 0.191 ** -0.252 0.203
Dyadic difference in
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.048 0.083 -0.005 0.088 0.053 0.083 -0.003 0.089
Round 1 winnings 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Age (years) -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 * -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 **
Househodl head -0.194 0.176 -0.172 0.178 -0.187 0.174 -0.180 0.178
Schooling (years) 0.018 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.017 0.030 0.027 0.029
ln(household income) 0.087 0.086 0.064 0.061 0.086 0.086 0.062 0.061
ln(livestock wealth) 0.022 0.045 0.005 0.042 0.021 0.045 0.006 0.042
Dyadic sum of
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.066 0.056 0.045 0.056 0.066 0.056 0.047 0.057
Round 1 winnings -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 * -0.001 0.001
Age (years) 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.007
Househodl head -0.097 0.192 0.124 0.198 -0.084 0.191 0.140 0.200
Schooling (years) 0.035 0.031 0.063 0.031 ** 0.032 0.031 0.064 0.031 **
ln(household income) -0.058 0.074 -0.015 0.066 -0.059 0.074 -0.014 0.065
ln(livestock wealth) 0.049 0.047 0.003 0.043 0.051 0.047 0.002 0.043
Constant -2.223 1.503 -2.159 1.341 -2.194 1.521 -2.182 1.348
Village dummies included no yes no yes
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-
independence across dyads with a common element; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%.
Table A4. Dyadic analysis exploring the role of religion all estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed gender dyad -2.529 0.513 *** -2.530 0.521 *** -2.455 0.538 *** -2.446 0.538 ***
T2 x Mixed gender dyad 1.609 0.709 ** 1.521 0.729 ** 1.373 0.755 * 1.299 0.773 *
T3 x Mixed gender dyad 1.075 0.771 1.015 0.776 1.145 0.752 1.101 0.758
Mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership -0.413 0.446 -0.474 0.422
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership 1.290 0.680 * 1.275 0.671 *
Number of females in dyad 0.063 0.178 0.028 0.182 0.042 0.179 0.012 0.181
T2 x Number of females in dyad 0.118 0.359 -0.020 0.380 0.102 0.351 -0.021 0.378
T3 x Number of females in dyad 0.085 0.277 -0.073 0.286 0.064 0.283 -0.095 0.288
No. females in dyad x Religious co-membership 0.103 0.206 0.092 0.220
T2 x No. females in dyad x Religious co-membership 0.239 0.387 0.196 0.422
T2 (Treatment 2) -0.984 0.516 * -0.923 0.500 *
T3 (Treatment 3) -2.222 0.440 *** -2.226 0.435 ***
Family (blood or marriage) -0.060 0.249 -0.119 0.263 -0.060 0.250 -0.112 0.264
Religious co-membership 0.056 0.197 0.071 0.196 -0.043 0.340 -0.004 0.335
CBO co-mememberships 0.097 0.077 0.112 0.076 0.096 0.078 0.110 0.077
T2 x Family -0.144 0.542 -0.348 0.541 -0.143 0.544 -0.373 0.535
T2 x Religious co-membership -0.127 0.476 0.415 0.471 -0.766 0.424 -0.183 0.373
T2 x CBO co-mememberships 0.377 0.190 ** 0.155 0.196 0.387 0.190 ** 0.173 0.193
T3 x Family 1.091 0.513 ** 1.128 0.572 ** 1.085 0.519 ** 1.116 0.580 *
T3 x Religious co-membership 0.875 0.414 ** 1.047 0.422 ** 0.933 0.426 ** 1.112 0.430 ***
T3 x CBO co-mememberships -0.471 0.191 ** -0.301 0.197 -0.469 0.191 ** -0.301 0.196
Dyadic difference in
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.048 0.083 -0.005 0.088 0.050 0.083 -0.003 0.088
Round 1 winnings 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Age (years) -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 * -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 *
Househodl head -0.194 0.176 -0.172 0.178 -0.201 0.177 -0.174 0.179
Schooling (years) 0.018 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.019 0.030 0.028 0.029
ln(household income) 0.087 0.086 0.064 0.061 0.084 0.086 0.064 0.061
ln(livestock wealth) 0.022 0.045 0.005 0.042 0.022 0.045 0.005 0.042
Dyadic sum of
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.066 0.056 0.045 0.056 0.066 0.056 0.045 0.056
Round 1 winnings -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001
Age (years) 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007
Househodl head -0.097 0.192 0.124 0.198 -0.093 0.189 0.129 0.196
Schooling (years) 0.035 0.031 0.063 0.031 ** 0.036 0.031 0.064 0.032
ln(household income) -0.058 0.074 -0.015 0.066 -0.062 0.075 -0.017 0.066
ln(livestock wealth) 0.049 0.047 0.003 0.043 0.050 0.047 0.004 0.043
Constant -2.223 1.503 -2.159 1.341 -2.185 1.505 -2.183 1.362
Village dummies included no yes no yes
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-
independence across dyads with a common element; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%.
Table A5. Dyadic analysis exploring the role of family all estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed gender dyad -2.529 0.513 *** -2.530 0.521 *** -2.674 0.568 *** -2.666 0.570 ***
T2 x Mixed gender dyad 1.609 0.709 ** 1.521 0.729 ** 1.755 0.751 ** 1.634 0.770 **
T3 x Mixed gender dyad 1.075 0.771 1.015 0.776 0.882 0.736 0.816 0.753
Mixed gender dyad x Family 0.725 0.489 0.714 0.496
T2 x Mixed gender dyad x Family -0.841 0.932 -0.721 0.913
Number of females in dyad 0.063 0.178 0.028 0.182 0.045 0.179 0.008 0.183
T2 x Number of females in dyad 0.118 0.359 -0.020 0.380 0.343 0.360 0.227 0.386
T3 x Number of females in dyad 0.085 0.277 -0.073 0.286 0.081 0.277 -0.095 0.286
No. females in dyad x Family 0.091 0.211 0.140 0.232
T2 x No. females in dyad x Family -1.007 0.471 ** -1.029 0.511 **
T2 (Treatment 2) -0.984 0.516 * -1.252 0.561 **
T3 (Treatment 3) -2.222 0.440 *** -2.168 0.440 ***
Family (blood or marriage) -0.060 0.249 -0.119 0.263 -0.265 0.271 -0.392 0.325
Religious co-membership 0.056 0.197 0.071 0.196 0.061 0.197 0.075 0.197
CBO co-mememberships 0.097 0.077 0.112 0.076 0.100 0.077 0.115 0.076
T2 x Family -0.144 0.542 -0.348 0.541 1.116 0.749 0.905 0.864
T2 x Religious co-membership -0.127 0.476 0.415 0.471 -0.120 0.478 0.429 0.470
T2 x CBO co-mememberships 0.377 0.190 ** 0.155 0.196 0.393 0.188 ** 0.193 0.196
T3 x Family 1.091 0.513 ** 1.128 0.572 ** 1.028 0.517 ** 1.073 0.591
T3 x Religious co-membership 0.875 0.414 ** 1.047 0.422 ** 0.865 0.409 ** 1.036 0.420 **
T3 x CBO co-mememberships -0.471 0.191 ** -0.301 0.197 -0.475 0.187 ** -0.304 0.195
Dyadic difference in
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.048 0.083 -0.005 0.088 0.043 0.084 -0.011 0.089
Round 1 winnings 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Age (years) -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 * -0.015 0.009 * -0.018 0.009 **
Househodl head -0.194 0.176 -0.172 0.178 -0.183 0.176 -0.159 0.178
Schooling (years) 0.018 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.016 0.030 0.025 0.030
ln(household income) 0.087 0.086 0.064 0.061 0.086 0.085 0.066 0.060
ln(livestock wealth) 0.022 0.045 0.005 0.042 0.021 0.045 0.004 0.042
Dyadic sum of
Round 1 gambel chocie 0.066 0.056 0.045 0.056 0.068 0.055 0.046 0.056
Round 1 winnings -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001
Age (years) 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007
Househodl head -0.097 0.192 0.124 0.198 -0.093 0.194 0.130 0.201
Schooling (years) 0.035 0.031 0.063 0.031 ** 0.033 0.031 0.062 0.031 **
ln(household income) -0.058 0.074 -0.015 0.066 -0.057 0.074 -0.010 0.065
ln(livestock wealth) 0.049 0.047 0.003 0.043 0.049 0.047 0.002 0.043
Constant -2.223 1.503 -2.159 1.341 -2.139 1.505 -2.157 1.335
Village dummies included no yes no yes
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-
independence across dyads with a common element; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%.
